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Abstract
We presents evidence that non-ﬁnancial customers are the main liquidity providers in the
overnight foreign exchange market using a unique daily data set covering almost all trans-
actions in the SEK/EUR market over almost ten years. Two main ﬁndings support this:
(i) The net position of non-ﬁnancial customers is negatively correlated with the exchange
rate, opposed to the positive correlation found for ﬁnancial customers; (ii) Changes in net
position of non-ﬁnancial customers are forecasted by changes in net position of ﬁnancial
customers, indicating that non-ﬁnancial customers take a passive role consistent with liq-
uidity provision.
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The provision of liquidity is important for well-functioning asset markets. Liquid markets
match counterparties well (immediacy), have low transaction costs (tight spreads), and are
less volatile (O’Hara, 1995).
In this paper, we study liquidity provision in the foreign exchange market. A central ques-
tion raised is the following: Who is providing liquidity? The conventional wisdom is that
market making banks are the main liquidity providers in ﬂoating exchange rate regimes.
However, from the studies by Lyons (1995) and Bjønnes and Rime (2004) we know that
dealers of market making banks have only limited overnight positions and cannot be ex-
pected to take lasting open positions. Hence, market making banks provide liquidity intra-
day, but are less likely to provide liquidity on longer horizons. In this paper, we empirically
investigate whether there is a particular group of market participants that act as liquidity
providers overnight. To address this question, we use a unique data set from the Swedish
krona (SEK) market that contains observations of 90-95% of all transactions in ﬁve dif-
ferent instruments on a day-to-day basis from the beginning of 1993 up to the summer of
2002.
The study of liquidity in the foreign exchange market is particularly interesting for at least
two reasons. First, our understanding of the movements of ﬂoating exchange rates is rather
poor, and better knowledge of how the market works may improve our understanding.
Second, as a largely unregulated market, patterns of liquidity provision have evolved en-
dogenously. This is in contrast to several equity markets where, e.g., market makers have
obligations to provide liquidity. Dan´ ıelsson and Payne (2002) study intraday liquidity in
an electronic FX order book. The present paper is to the best of our knowledge the ﬁrst to
study liquidity in a longer perspective for the foreign exchange market.
Our data allow us to distinguish between four distinct groups of market participants: (i)
Market making banks; (ii) Financial customers; (iii) Non-Financial customers; and (iv)
the Central Bank (Sveriges Riksbank). Currently there is no other data set on the foreign
exchange market that gives such broad overview of the trading of a single currency. A no-
table feature of our data is that the ﬂows of different customers (Financial, Non-Financial,
and the Central Bank), will equal the ﬂow of Market making banks. 1 If ﬂows of one group
1 We use the term “ﬂow” for changes in position.
2of participants are positively correlated with changes in the foreign exchange rate, we will
see a negative correlation for another group, or groups, of participants.
How can we identify the liquidity provider? The theory of market making predicts that
a positive demand shock (i.e., a purchase by the aggressive part in the trade) will lead
the market maker to revise prices upwards, hence a positive contemporaneous correlation
between the trading decision of the aggressive part and the change of the exchange rate. 2
The supplier of the asset, e.g., a market maker, will ﬁll the role of liquidity provider. There
are in particular two characteristics of liquidity providers: (a) The net ﬂow of liquidity
providers will be negatively correlated with the change in the value of the currency; and
(b) Liquidity providers match others’ demand and supply passively.
These two predictions are borne out in the data. Our ﬁndings suggest that Non-Financial
customers are the main liquidity providers overnight. First, we ﬁnd a negative correla-
tion between the net purchases of foreign currency made by Non-Financial customers and
changes in the exchange rate. This negative correlation is matched by a positive correla-
tion between net purchases of Financial customers and changes in the exchange rate. The
coefﬁcients of the two groups are not only similar in absolute value, but is also very stable.
These ﬁndings lead us to conclude that the Non-Financial customers we observe fulﬁll re-
quirement (a) above, while Financial customers do not. The fact that the foreign exchange
rate and positions held by Financial and Non-Financial customers are cointegrated suggest
that the price effect is permanent.
Second, requirement (b), that the presumed liquidity providers passively match changes
in the demand and supply of others, is tested using Granger causality. We ﬁnd that the
trading of Financial customers tends to forecast the trading of Non-Financial customers.
This suggests that the Non-Financial customer group is not in the active end of trading.
These results are not obvious. Four important issues might come to mind. First, if these
are liquidity effects, how can they be permanent? It is important to remember that it is not
liquidity effects that cause the change in the exchange rate. The exchange rate change is
due to a portfolio shock by the Financial customers. We identify the supply of liquidity
that meets this portfolio shock (more on the economic intuition for the permanent effect
2 Using the terminology of microstructure, a purchase by the aggressive part in the trade is a pos-
itive order ﬂow, while a sale is negative. We use the phrase “aggressive part” instead of “initiator”
or “aggressor” which is more common in microstructure, because a non-market making liquidity
provider may also “initiate” trades. Strictly speaking, only market makers do not initiate trades.
3below). Second, it might seem counter-intuitive that Non-Financial customers should pro-
vide liquidity. However, one should note that Non-Financial customers in our data behave
like proﬁt-takers; they react to a change in the exchange rate. A liquidity provider, as used
here, is one who enters the market as a reaction to the action of others. It is not necessary
for the Non-Financial to perceive themselves as liquidity providers.
Third, it is clear that the group of Financial customers must be very diversiﬁed. It should
contain a spectrum of customers from hedge funds to portfolio managers. Especially hedge
funds might use a range of trading strategies. If anything, this could weaken our ﬁnd-
ings relative to a data set were we could identify hedge funds speciﬁcally. Last, if Non-
Financial behave like proﬁt-takers, are they then “Friedman speculators”? The positions of
a Friedman speculator will be negatively correlated with the exchange rate when the level
is moving away from equilibrium, while the positions will be positively correlated with
the exchange when the rate is moving towards the equilibrium level. Hence, the liquidity
providers do not necessarily act as “Friedman speculators.”
Closest in spirit to this paper are those by Froot and Ramadorai (2002) and Fan and Lyons
(2003). Froot and Ramadorai (2002) have data from the global custodian State Street Cor-
poration, covering transactions over a period of seven years in 111 currencies. Given the
source of the data, it is reasonable to believe that the transactions are those of ﬁnancial
customers. Fan and Lyons (2003) use data on customer trading from Citibank. Both stud-
ies ﬁnd results similar to ours for ﬁnancial customers. While the data employed by Froot
and Ramadorai (2002) and Fan and Lyons (2003) only represent a small market share of
total currency transactions in a currency, our data reﬂect entire market activity. Also in
contrast to these studies, our data allow us to directly test how ﬂows of different groups of
customers are related to changes in the foreign exchange rate.
Togiveabrieftheoreticalinterpretationofourresults,wemayconsiderthemodelbyEvans
and Lyons (2002). A trading day is split into three trading rounds. In the ﬁrst round, market
making banks provide liquidity to customers. To ofﬂoad their inventories after trading with
non-bank customers in round 1, dealers trade among themselves in round 2. However, if
there is excess demand for one currency after the round of interdealer trading, the market
making banks must induce the customers to hold this. The customers in round 3 then need
a risk premium to be willing to change their portfolio holdings. Hence, one expects to
see a positive correlation between round 1 excess demand for a currency and the value of
this currency. Using data from the interdealer market, Evans and Lyons (2002) ﬁnd strong
4empirical support for such a positive correlation.
In the Evans and Lyons (2002) model, market making banks provide liquidity intraday
to round 1 customers, while round 3 customers are compensated for providing overnight
liquidity. In this model net purchases of all customers sum to zero after the third round of
trading. However, this does not mean that net purchases of a particular group of customers
must sum to zero. In light of the Evans and Lyons (2002) model, it is possible to interpret
our results such that the typical aggressive round 1 customer is ﬁnancial, while the typical
liquidity providing round 3 customer is non-ﬁnancial.
Our results also have implications for the exchange rate determination puzzle (see, e.g.,
Meese and Rogoff, 1983; Frankel and Rose, 1995). A better understanding of the role
played by different market participants may be necessary to understand the movements of
exchange rates. We document cointegration between the exchange rate and net currency
positions held by Financial and Non-Financial customers, which suggests that price ef-
fects are permanent. We also show that net ﬂows are able to explain changes in the foreign
exchange rate at frequencies commonly used in tests of macroeconomic models. The ex-
planatory power is very good. Flows by Financial or Non-Financial customers combined
with interest rate differentials explain roughly 70% of changes in the foreign exchange
rate at the 90-day horizon. As mentioned, the coefﬁcient for the net ﬂow of Financial or
Non-Financial customers is also remarkably stable over the sample.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses liquidity provision in FX markets.
Our data is presented in Section 3. Section 4 reports the results on our attempts to iden-
tify the liquidity provider. Section 5 provides a discussion of our results, while Section 6
concludes.
2 Liquidity provision in FX markets
FX dealers provide liquidity by offering bid and ask quotes to other dealers or non-bank
customers. The aggressive part in a trade buys at the ask and sells at the bid (ask > bid).
Microstructure models predict that a buy initiative will increase price, while a sell initiative
will decrease price. Two main branches of models give different explanations for this.
Inventory control models (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Ho and Stoll, 1981) focus
on how risk-averse dealers adjust prices to control their inventory of an asset. In these
5models, a purchase by the aggressive trader will push up prices because the dealer typically
will increase price to attract sellers when his inventory is smaller than desired. This effect
is only temporary. When the dealer has reached his target inventory, the effect disappears.
Information-basedmodels(e.g.,Kyle,1985;GlostenandMilgrom,1985)considerlearning
and adverse selection problems when some market participants have private information.
When a dealer receives a trade, he will revise his expectations (upward in the case of a buy
order and downward in the case of a sell order) and set spreads to protect himself against
informed traders. The information effect is permanent. The microstructure theory predicts
that the ﬂow by the aggressive trader will be positively correlated with contemporaneous
pricechanges.Flowsofliquidityproviders,however,isexpectedtobenegativelycorrelated
with contemporaneous price changes.
Dealers provide liquidity in the FX market, but mostly intraday. Dealers usually do not
take large overnight positions (see Lyons, 1995; Bjønnes and Rime, 2004). This means
that dealers will ofﬂoad most of their inventories to non-bank customers before they end
the day. 3 Can we expect any particular group of market participants to systematically ﬁll
the role of overnight liquidity provider?
Evans and Lyons (2002) develop a model with three trading rounds each day. Before quot-
ing in round 1, all dealers receive public (macroeconomic) information r (R = å
t rt). After
quoting in round 1 (Pi1 = P1 because all dealers have the same information), each of the N







dealer’s customer order is not observed by other dealers, and hence are private information.
Round 2 is the interdealer trading round. After quoting in round 2 (dealers do not want
to reveal their information, hence Pi2 = P2), the dealers trade among themselves to share
inventory risk and to speculate on their (private) information from their round 1 customer
trades.Netinterdealer tradesinitiatedbydealer i (Ti2)isproportional tohiscustomerorders
in round 1 (Ti2 = gci1). At the close of round 2, all dealers observe the net interdealer order
ﬂow (x = å
N
i=1Ti2). The order ﬂows in the interdealer trading mirrors the customer trading
in round 1. In FX markets, dealers obtain estimates of interdealer order ﬂows from the
brokers.
In round 3, dealers use information on net interdealer order ﬂow in round 2 to set prices
3 Mean reversion in dealer inventories is much faster in FX markets than in equity markets
(Bjønnes and Rime, 2004).
6such that the public willingly absorbs all dealer imbalances. To set the round 3 price, deal-
ers need to know (i) the total ﬂow that the public needs to absorb, which they learn by
observing x, and (ii) the public’s risk-bearing capacity. If dealers (on average) are long
in dollars, they must reduce the price for dollars to induce customers to buy dollars. The
round 3 price is
Pi3 = P3 = P2+bx, (1)
where b is some constants depending on the customers’ demand and the dealers’ trading
strategy.
If customers net buy, e.g., euros in round 1, the aggregate interdealer order ﬂow observed
at the end of round 2 will be positive because dealers try to buy back euros. Since dealers
lay off all their inventories during round 3, this means that aggregate customer orders in




x = −c3. (2)
Evans and Lyons (2002) test their model using data on interest rates and order ﬂows from
the interdealer market. They show that the interdealer ﬂows can explain a large proportion
of daily changes in foreign exchange rates (JPY/USD and DEM/USD). Without customer
data they are not able to examine the trading in round 1 and 3 directly. So far, this trading
is a black box.
In this paper, we focus on round 1 and 3. If the typical round 1 customer is different from
the typical round 3 customer, we may say that different types of customers ﬁll different
roles. Round 1 customers are the active ones because they are ﬁrst and because they are
responsible for the dealers’ inventory imbalances. Round 3 customers are passive because
they absorb the dealers’ imbalances.
It is important to understand that the Evans-Lyons model is a very stylized description of
the foreign exchange market. In the real-world, trading takes place continuously. At any
point throughout the trading day, dealers can trade with one another and receive customer
orders. Customer trades are executed with a wide bid/ask spread. Some dealers will want to
close out immediately the positions that results from executing a customer order, earning
money on the bid/ask spread. Other dealers will speculate on intraday price movement. If
there is excess supply or demand for a currency, which means that dealers as a whole are
not willing to keep the net position of a currency, dealers will adjust their prices. When
7adjusting prices up or down, some customers will be induced to place orders because they
ﬁnd the price attractive, and thus absorb some of the excess supply or demand. Eventually,
the price of the currency has adjusted to a level such that dealers as a whole are willing
to hold their remaining positions overnight. The price may indeed have adjusted to a price
where dealers as a whole have a zero net position.
An alternative to the ﬁrst round-third round framework may be to think of the different
customers as either pushing the market or being pulled by the market. 4 Push-customers
initiate price rises or falls through their net buy or sell orders. Their trading will be pos-
itively correlated with price movements. Pull-customers are customers that are attracted
into the market by prices which suit them because they wish to trade on a certain side of
the market and decide to act now rather than postpone the trade in the hope of achieving a
better price. Their trading will be negatively correlated with price movements.
3 Data from the Swedish krona vs. euro market
The Riksbank receives daily reports from a number of Swedish and foreign banks (primary
dealers or market makers, ten as of spring 2002) on their buying and selling of ﬁve different
instruments (spot, forward, short swap, standard swap and option). In our sample, stretch-
ing from January 1993 to June 28, 2002, a total of 27 reporting banks are represented. Only
ﬁve banks are represented in the whole sample, and there are never more than 15 at any
point of time. The reporting banks are anonymized, but we know whether they are Swedish
or foreign. The two largest Swedish banks conduct about 43% of all gross trading in the
market. The reported series is an aggregate of Swedish krona (SEK) trading against all
other currencies, measured in krona, and covers 90–95% of all worldwide trading in SEK.
Close to 100% of all interdealer trading and 80–90% of customer trading are in SEK/EUR.
In our analysis we will therefore focus on the SEK/EUR exchange rate.
Aggregate volume information is not available to the market. Foreign exchange markets
are organized as multiple dealer markets, and have low transparency. The speciﬁc reporter
only knows his own volume and a noisy signal on aggregate volume that it receives through
brokers. Reporting banks obtain some statistical summaries of volume aggregates from the
4 We are grateful to professor Mark P. Taylor for suggesting the terms “push”- and “pull”-
customers.
8Riksbank, but only with a considerable lag. The data set used in this paper is not available
to market participants.
The trades of a Market making bank i (MMi) can be divided into (i) trades with other
Market making banks (MM-trade), (ii) trades with Financial customers (FIN), (iii) trades
with Non-Financial customers (NON-FIN), and (iv) trades with Sveriges Riksbank (CB).
The sum of this trading will amount to the change in the currency position (ﬂow) of the
Market making bank. Throughout, we will let these names indicate net positions, where
accumulation of ﬂows begins January 2, 1993. By deﬁnition we have
D(MM-TRADE)i+D(FIN)i+D(NON-FIN)i+DCBi = −DMMi, (3)
where all positions are measured as a more positive number if holdings of foreign currency
increase.
Our data also let us know whether a counterparty is Swedish or foreign. In this paper,
nationality is not an important distinction when addressing our research question. In the
traditional portfolio balance model, however, the focus is on nationality. This is probably
mainly a reﬂection of data availability. As there has been no data on actual currency trans-
actions, researchers have used the current account as a proxy for portfolio shifts over time.
As we have data on currency transactions, we need not consider this limitation. However,
we do test for the importance of nationality as an explanatory factor in our models (see
Section 5).
Swedish Market makers have 74% of the Financial customers’ trading and 83% of the Non-
Financial customers’ trading. The Financial market share of all customer trades is 60% for
our data set (the market share of Non-Financial customers is thus 40%). These numbers
are very close to the market shares reported by the triennial statistics published by the
Bank for International Settlements for all currency markets, in which the customer market
share of Financial customers has increased from 43% in 1992 to 66% in 2001. Measured
over all years, their market share is 56%. The central bank is barely present in the sample,
only 0.4% of total trades. Most of the transactions by Sveriges Riksbank in our sample are
related to Swedish government debt. 5
5 Our data allows us to separate central bank interventions from other types of central bank trades.
In our data set, there are only a few episodes with interventions (see Solheim, 2004, for more
details).
9In this paper we focus on net changes in currency positions, or currency risk (for a dis-
cussion of gross ﬂows, see Bjønnes, Rime, and Solheim, 2005). How should we measure
currency positions? A swap is by deﬁnition a position that net itself out. In other words,
we can ignore trading in swaps. Options may contain interesting information. However,
the option market in SEK is limited. To get a picture of currency positions, we focus on
the sum of net spot and forward positions. Only using spot positions would give a distorted
picture of the risk the participants are willing to take. Our data shows a signiﬁcant negative
correlation between spot and forward positions for all types of participants. The correlation
when measured in changes (ﬂows) is about -0.7.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for different groups at the 30-day horizon. None
of the series are normally distributed. Most of the non-normality is due to skewness. We
see that skewness for Financial and Non-Financial customers have opposite signs. Also,
the standard deviations are of similar size.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics on currency ﬂows at the 30-day horizon.
Financial Non-ﬁn. Market Central
customers customers makers bank
Mean -0.56 -0.03 0.36 0.23
Std. Dev. 1.21 1.13 0.73 0.25
Skewness 0.34 -0.29 -0.41 0.12
Kurtosis 3.78 3.19 4.50 3.31
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. All series are in SEK 10 billion.
From Table 1 we see that Market making banks (to some extent) tend to accumulate foreign
currency (positive mean). To understand this ﬁnding, we should remember that the banks
have operations other than market making. Market making dealers (and the proprietary
tradingdesk)mayholdsomeovernightpositions,butthepositionswillnotaccumulateover
time. This currency risk is probably held by the customers of the bank through different
funds etc. offered by the bank. These customers can be both ﬁnancial or non-ﬁnancial.
Correlations between ﬂows can give a ﬁrst clue on liquidity provision. The correlation
between the ﬂows of Market making banks and Financial customers is negative, as we
would expect, at -0.46. Note, however, the strong negative correlation, -0.80, between ﬂows
of Financial and Non-Financial customers.
Table 2 shows the correlation between ﬂows and some macro variables at the quarterly
frequency. By considering the quarterly frequency we may include the current account
and the trade balance. We see that Financial customers tend to buy foreign currency when
10the bond returns in Sweden increase relative to German bond returns (return on ten-year
bonds). For three-month interest rates this relationship is much weaker. We also see that
Financial customers tend to buy Swedish kroner when the return on the Swedish stock
market increases relative to the world stock market, and in particular when the Swedish
stock market return increases. These stock market-FX correlations are well-known among
FX dealers. For measures of inﬂation, current account and the trade balance, there are no
signiﬁcantcorrelationswithﬂowsofFinancialcustomers.ForNon-Financial customerswe
ﬁnd a negative correlation between changes in relative bond returns and net ﬂows. When
the relative performance of the Swedish stock market increases, Non-Financial customers
tend to sell Swedish kroner. Interestingly, we see that ﬂows of Non-Financial customers are
heavily correlated with the current account and trade balance. This suggests that, to some
extent, these customers can be characterized as “current account traders.” 6
Table 2




D(RDIF10Y) 0.25 -0.13 -0.07
D(RDIF3M) 0.04 0.04 -0.21
D(STOCK DIF) -0.25 0.26 -0.25
D(STOCK SWE) -0.45 0.35 -0.10
D(CPI SWE-CPI GER) -0.04 0.05 -0.20
Current account 0.01 -0.41 0.35
Trade balance -0.05 -0.36 0.56
Sample: 1.1993-6.2002. Change in variable is indicated by “D.” RDIF10Y is the difference between the yield to maturity for Swedish
and German bonds with ten years to maturity. Similarly, RDIF3M is the difference between Swedish and German 3-month interest rates.
STOCKDIF is the difference between the return on Swedish and European (ex. Sweden) stock market indexes, while STOCK SWE
is the return on the Swedish stock market index. D(CPI SWE)−D(CPI GER) measures the difference between Swedish and Foreign
inﬂation.
WhileﬂowsofFinancialcustomersshownosigniﬁcantcorrelationwiththecurrentaccount
and the trade balance, we see that ﬂows of the central bank are positively correlated with
the current account and trade balance. This may be explained by the increased foreign
borrowing during the ﬁrst half of the nineties by the central bank on behalf of the Swedish
Debt Ofﬁce. Table 2 suggests that Non-Financial customers are their (ﬁnal) counterpart in
these trades (the correlation between these ﬂows is -0.28).
6 We do not mean that their trades are only related to the current account. For instance, Non-
Financial customers contribute to direct investments.
114 Empirical results
In this section, we provide our empirical results. First, we test for cointegration between the
foreign exchange rate and positions held by Financial and Non-Financial customers (ac-
cumulated ﬂows). Second, we examine the short-run dynamics at different horizons, from
the daily to the 90-day horizon. We need to establish that there is a systematic correlation
between the trading of a group and the exchange rate, and that this correlation is matched
(and has the opposite sign) for some other group. Third, to convince the reader that the data
matches the theoretical predictions about liquidity provision we need to establish that the
ﬂows of the group positively correlated with the exchange rate is actually the active part of
the market (round 1 player), while the group with negative correlation between their ﬂows
and the exchange rate is on the passive side (round 3 player).
In all regressions, we use the log of the SEK/EUR measured at close of the Swedish mar-
ket (shown in Figure 1). However, such a series is only available starting January 1, 1994.
Hence, all regressions begin at this point. We use the 10-year bond yield differential and
the 3-month interest rate differential as proxies for macroeconomic variables.The 10-year
differential may capture long-term macroeconomic expectations while the 3-month differ-
ential captures short-term expectations.
4.1 Cointegration

































where P is the level of the exchange rate, r is public macroeconomic information, and








1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Fig. 1. The SEK/EUR exchange rate
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. Note that for observations prior to January 1, 1999, we use DEM instead of EUR. Before January 1, 1999 the
majority of SEK trading was conducted in DEM as it is currently conducted in EUR.
customers’ ﬂow, respectively. The three ﬁrst equations are cointegrating relations (levels),
while the fourth describes the relation between daily ﬂows. Our data allows estimation of
the three relations in Eqs. (4a), (4c), and (4d), and our discussion henceforth will therefore
refer to these equations. 7
As a set of predictions of a uniﬁed theory it is preferable to estimate the equations as a
system. The two cointegrating relations in Eqs. (4a) and (4c) cannot, however, be estimated
together because they would be expected to be identical. One could instead estimate one of
the price relations together with the relation between daily ﬂows of the customers, Eq. (4d).
As discussed in Section 2, in reality the ﬂows of the customers will not match perfectly on
a day-to-day basis. One implications of this is that Eq. (4d) should rather be interpreted
as a steady state relation, and hence could be estimated as part of a cointegrating system
(with positions instead of ﬂows). We therefore look at two equivalent versions of the same
7 The cointegration vector with interdealer order ﬂow is, however, analyzed by Killeen, Lyons, and
Moore (2004). They ﬁnd that the predicted properties hold.
13system. In the ﬁrst version, we estimate the price equation with the position of Financial
customers, Eq. (4a), and the steady state relation between the two customer groups, Eq.
(4d). In the second version we replace Financial customers with Non-Financial customers,
Eq. (4c).
The cointegrating equations are estimated using the Johansen method on daily observa-
tions. We include the 3-month and 10-year interest rate differentials in the estimations.
Interest-differentials are usually assumed to be stationary. However, in the sample they are
clearly non-stationary. Including a stationary variable in the cointegration framework may
affect the cointegration tests. On the other hand, treating a non-stationary variable, in the
sample, as stationary in the cointegration framework may have implications for the infer-
ence. We therefore choose to treat the interest variables as non-stationary in order to get
the correct inference.
Unit root tests (see appendix) show that all variables in the cointegrating vectors are non-
stationary. 8 We only model the exchange rate and the two customer positions in the VAR,
while the other variables in the cointegration analysis are restricted to be within the vectors.
Differences of these other variables enter the VAR as exogenous.
Panela)ofTable3showstheﬁnalversionofthetwosetsofcointegratingvectors.Theprice
equations are normalized on the exchange rate, while the steady state position equation is
normalized on Non-Financial customers’ position. Panel b) reports the error correction
terms. The columns refer to the cointegrating vector in question, while the rows represent
the equations in the VAR where the vectors enter. The restrictions we impose are (a) that
either Financial or Non-Financial positions are excluded from the cointegration vector and
(b) that both Financial and Non-Financial positions are excluded from the error correction
term of the equation standardized on the exchange rate. All restrictions are found to hold,
as reported in panel c) of the table. 9
From the two price relations, columns 2 and 4, we see that the two position coefﬁcients
are signiﬁcant. As expected, Financial customers act as the aggressive traders, while the
negativecoefﬁcientfortheNon-Financialcustomersisconsistentwiththesebeingliquidity
8 An exception is the position of the Central Bank. While the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects
the null of unit root at the 10%-level, other tests like the Ng-Perron, Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin, and Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock test clearly indicate a unit root. The question is therefore unre-
solved. Excluding the Central Bank does not seem to affect the cointegration tests.
9 A less restricted version is in the appendix.
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Cointegration results, daily observations
Financial Non-Financial
a) Cointegration SEK/EUR Non-Fin pos SEK/EUR Non-Fin pos
Financial 0.0092 -1 0 -1
(0.0036) (–) (–) (–)
Non-Financial 0 -0.0063
(–) (0.0021)
10-year bond diff. 4.83 0 3.52 0
(1.42) (–) (1.36) (–)
3-month diff. -1.89 0 -1.38 0
(1.00) (–) (1.09) (–)
CB-position 0 -1.68 0 -1.83
(–) (0.20) (–) (0.26)
MM-position 0 -0.65 0 -0.53
(–) (0.19) (–) (0.24)
Trend 0.00020 0 0 0
(0.00006) (–) (–) (–)
b) Error correction term
DSEK/EUR -0.0131 -0.000121 -0.0121 -0.000047
(0.0029) (0.000054) (0.0030) (0.000041)
DNonFinancial 0 -0.001863 0 -0.001635
(–) (0.000541) (–) (0.000473)
DFinancial 0 0 0 0
(–) (–) (–) (–)
c) Test Test stat. p-value Test stat. p-value
LR test of restrictions 4.84 0.85 8.09 0.62
No. Observations 2214 2214
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. Cointegration estimated with the Johansen-method. The VAR models the exchange rate change and the ﬂow
of the two customer groups. The other variables in the cointegrating vectors are not modeled. Differences of these, and one lag of
differences, are included in the VAR. The VAR contains two lags, determined by F-test. Standard errors of coefﬁcients in parenthesis.
The SEK/EUR cointegrating vectors are normalized on the exchange rate, while the position cointegrating vectors in column Non-Fin
pos are normalized on the position of the Non-Financial customers. Cointegration results are reported as if the normalizing variable is a
left-hand-side variable. Panel b) reports the error correction term. The columns indicate the cointegrating vector, while the rows indicate
which equation in the VAR the vector enters. All cells without standard error are the result of restrictions. The test of the restrictions is
reported in panel c).
providers. Furthermore, the cointegrating equations for the positions, columns 3 and 5,
show that the two groups indeed match each other, as predicted by Eq. (4d).
The restrictions on the error correction term indicate that the position of both groups of cus-
tomers is weakly exogenous to the price. This is reasonable, given that we expect Financial
customers to “push” the market utilizing private information. The fact that the effect from
their trading is positive and persistent is an indication that there indeed is an information
effect. The trend enters signiﬁcantly in the price equation for the Financial customers, but
not for the Non-Financial (restricted to zero). Engle and Yoo (1991) suggest that the trend
15captures other unobservable variables. If the trading of the Financial customers are partly
driven by information that has not yet reached the market, while the Non-Financial cus-
tomers act as liquidity providers, we would expect that the trend should enter the price
equation with the position of Financial customers but not in the price equation of the Non-
Financialcustomers.TheintuitionfortheweakexogeneityofthepositionofNon-Financial
customers is that the banks “pick” price-quantity combinations along their supply curve.
One can think of this as if Non-Financial customers placed a limit-order schedule in the
market in the morning. Weak exogeneity allows us to run single-equation error correction
models with contemporaneous ﬂow as an exogenous variable. We return to this below.
4.2 Regressing exchange rate changes on customers’ ﬂows and changes in interest rates
Having established that there is a long-term relation between the net positions of customers
(accumulated ﬂow) and the exchange rate, we proceed to look at the relation between
net ﬂows (changes in net positions) and changes in the exchange rate. The cointegration
analysis established evidence of liquidity provision in the long run. By studying short-run
dynamics we can say something about liquidity provision overnight.
In all regressions, we include the error correction term from the cointegration analysis
presented above. As the two price cointegration vectors are equivalent, we use the vector
estimated using Non-Financial positions, as presented in Table 3. Using the price vector
with Financial positions would not alter any results. To utilize the fact that we have access
to daily data, we apply a standard GMM procedure to account for the fact that we have
overlapping observations when we look at changes beyond one day.
Table 4 reports regressions of changes in the foreign exchange rate on currency ﬂows of
Financial and Non-Financial customers for the 5-day, 30-day and 90-day horizon. As is
clear from Table 4, the sign on the coefﬁcient for Financial customers is positive and sig-
niﬁcant at all horizons reported. The coefﬁcient increases from 0.37% at the 5-day horizon
to 0.71% per SEK 10 billion at the 90-day horizon. These numbers are economically sig-
niﬁcant. For instance, at the 30-day horizon the standard deviation of currency ﬂows of
Financial customers is 12 billion SEK. An increase of one standard deviation in the net
ﬂow of Financial customers will then, on average, imply an increase in the foreign ex-
change rate of 0.66%. For comparison, the standard deviation for changes in the foreign
exchange rate over the 30-day horizon is 2.33%.
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Flows and returns
5 days 30 days 90 days
coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat.
Constant 0.11 4.23 ** 0.49 4.86 ** 1.13 6.57 **
DFinancial 0.0037 4.02 ** 0.0055 5.41 ** 0.0071 5.30 **
DRDIF10Y 3.18 12.61 ** 3.08 7.50 ** 2.99 7.13 **
DRDIF3M 0.80 2.88 ** 0.79 1.79 0.64 1.58
COINT(-n) -0.05 -4.21 ** -0.21 -4.81 ** -0.49 -6.48 **
R2 0.30 0.50 0.72
5 days 30 days 90 days
coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat. coef. t-stat.
Constant 0.11 4.10 ** 0.48 4.34 ** 1.14 5.85 **
DNon-Financial -0.0030 -3.05 ** -0.0052 -4.85 ** -0.0067 -5.03 **
DRDIF10Y 3.19 12.19 ** 3.22 7.18 ** 3.23 7.05 **
DRDIF3M 0.83 2.93 ** 0.88 1.83 0.74 1.55
COINT(-n) -0.05 -4.08 ** -0.21 -4.32 ** -0.50 -5.85 **
R2 0.29 0.48 0.69
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. The table shows a GMM regression on (log(SEK/EUR)t −log(SEK/EURt−n), where n indicate the number
of days over which we measure the return; 5, 30 and 90 days respectively. Similarly, “D” in front of a variable indicates change from
t−n tot. Net positions in currency are measured in SEK 10 billion. “Financial” is net positions of Financial customers, “Non-Financial”
are net positions of Non-Financial customers. RDIF10Y is the difference between the yield to maturity for Swedish and German bonds
with ten years to maturity. Similarly, RDIF3M is the difference between Swedish and German 3-month interest rates. Coint(-n) is the
error correction term from the cointegration analysis.
The cointegration vector is lagged with n periods. Estimations are made using daily data and overlapping samples. They are estimated
using GMM, with a weighting matrix that equals the set of exogenous variables, and standard errors are calculated using a variable
Newey-West bandwidth.
**(*) Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(5%) level.
The coefﬁcient for the error correction term is negative and signiﬁcant for all horizons
reported. At the ﬁve-day horizon, return to the long-run equilibrium takes place by 5% in
each period. For the 30-day and 90-day horizon, the adjustment to the long run equilibrium
takes place by 21% and 49% in each period, respectively.
The coefﬁcient for changes in the ten-year interest rate differential is positive and sig-
niﬁcant for all time horizons. An increase in the ten-year interest rate differential may
signal expectations of higher inﬂation in Sweden relative to Germany and the other euro-
countries. The strong correlation between the exchange rate and the 10-year interest rate
differential in Sweden is well known in the Swedish market and is mainly due to the fact
that when Sweden emerged from recession in the early 1990’s, the interest rate spread
narrowed and the exchange rate strengthened. The coefﬁcient for changes in the three-
month interest rate differential is only signiﬁcant at the ﬁve-day horizon. The coefﬁcient
is positive, which means that an increased interest rate differential is consistent with a
depreciating SEK.
17The explanatory power is very good. The regressions explain as much as 30-72% of all
variation in the dependent variable.
In the lower part of Table 4, we replicate the estimations, only substituting ﬂows of Fi-
nancial customers with ﬂows of Non-Financial customers. As we see, the coefﬁcient for
Non-Financial customers is also highly signiﬁcant for all time horizons. The coefﬁcient
size changes from -0.30% at the 5-day horizon to -0.67% per SEK 10 billion at a horizon
of 90 days. The coefﬁcients for the error correction term and the macro variables are sim-
ilar to those reported for the regressions with Financial customers. Again, the explanatory
power is very good. Between 29% and 69% of all variation in the dependent variable is
explained by the regressions. Furthermore, we notice that the coefﬁcient for Non-Financial
customers is almost exactly the opposite of the coefﬁcient on Financial customers. This is
an indication that Non-Financial customers also provide liquidity on shorter horizons.
It is sometimes argued that the relation between ﬂows and changes in the exchange rate
should be of a short-term nature. The cointegration results presented above suggest other-
wise. This is also conﬁrmed in a dynamic setting. As we can see from Table 4, both the
size of the coefﬁcient and the t-statistic on the ﬂow actually tend to increase as we lengthen
the horizon. This result is further conﬁrmed in Figure 2. Here, we graph the coefﬁcient for
the ﬂow variable for both Financial and Non-Financial customers when estimated at hori-
zons from one day to 250 days. The regression is equivalent to the regressions presented in
Table 4, and the sample covers the same period. As we can see, the absolute value of the
coefﬁcient increases in size for both variables when we move from returns measured from
1 to 100 days. Beyond 100 days, the coefﬁcient size stabilizes. 10
An interesting question is parameter stability. It is well known that coefﬁcients from regres-
sion for exchange rates do not tend to be very stable when one changes the sample period
under investigation. However, the ﬁndings in Table 4 are remarkably resilient to changes of
this kind. In ﬁgure 3, we report the coefﬁcient for both Financial and Non-Financial cus-
tomers, when we use 30-day return. We estimate a rolling regression with a 3-year window.
As one can see, the main result, that ﬂows of Financial customers have a positive impact,
while ﬂows of Non-Financial customers have a negative impact, is valid for all possible 3-
year samples from 1994 to 2002. This stability reﬂects signiﬁcant differences in behavior
between the two groups of customers.
10 This is consistent with results by Evans and Lyons (2004), who ﬁnd that it takes more than a
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Fig. 2. The coefﬁcient for ﬂows of (a) Financial and (b) Non-Financial customers, respectively, for
different time horizons
The ﬁgure displays the coefﬁcient +/- 2 standard errors when we change the length of the overlap in the GMM regression from 1 to 250
days. The regressions estimated are equal to the estimations presented in Table 4. The time sample is Jan. 1, 1994 to June 28, 2002.
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Fig. 3. Rolling estimations of the coefﬁcient (+/-2SE) using a 3-year window
The ﬁgure displays the coefﬁcient +/- 2 standard errors when we estimate the GMM regression with a 30-day overlap, as described in
Table 4, using a rolling regression with a 3-year window. The ﬁrst coefﬁcient is the value for a regression on the sample from Jan. 1,
1994 to Dec. 31, 1996. Panel (a) shows the coefﬁcient for Financial customers, while panel (b) shows the coefﬁcient for Non-Financial
customers.
4.3 Short-run dynamics
This subsection addresses two questions: Do Non-Financial customers provide liquidity
at all horizons, also the short term? And, do Market making banks only provide liquidity
intraday, or also at lower frequencies? Table 5 addresses short run dynamics for horizons
from one up to ten days. The regressions presented in Table 5 are similar to those reported
in Table 4, except for the time horizons reported and that we may include ﬂows of different
market participants in a single regression (also Market making banks). We can not, how-
ever, include ﬂows of Financial customers, Non-Financial customers and Market making
19banks in a single regression. This will give rise to high multicollinearity since ﬂows of the
central bank is small. We thus include only two groups in a single regression.
In Table 5, we separate between participants that push the market in the upper panel, and
participants that pull the market in the lower panel. We run two regressions, one with both
Financial and Non-Financial customers’ ﬂow (upper panel), and the second with Non-
Financial and Market making banks’ ﬂow. “Financial” under the heading “Variable” means
that we report the coefﬁcient for net ﬂow of Financial customers. We notice that Non-
Financial customers are included as participants that both push and pull the market. As we
will see, they push the market at the daily horizon, however, at all other horizons they pull
the market (i.e., provide liquidity).
Table 5
Flows, returns and short run dynamics.
Variable 1 day 5 day 10 day
Push Financial 0.0038 ** 0.0034 * 0.0039 *
Non-Financial 0.0034 ** -0.0004 -0.0005
Pull Non-Financial -0.0008 -0.0041 ** -0.0044 **
Market makers -0.0053 ** -0.0011 ** -0.0005 **
The table displays the coefﬁcients for the respective ﬂow coefﬁcients. All estimations follow the set up in Table 4, and are estimated
using GMM, including the change in the 3 month interest differential, 10 year interest differential and the lagged cointegration vector. 1
day, 5 days and 10 days refer to 1, 5 and 10 day overlapping samples. We run two regressions, one with both Financial and Non-Financial
customers’ ﬂow (upper panel), and the second with Non-Financial and Market making banks’ ﬂow (lower panel). “Financial” under the
heading “Variable” means that we report the coefﬁcient for net ﬂow of Financial customers.
**(*) Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%(5%) level.
In the regression including both Financial and Non-Financial customers, the coefﬁcient for
Financial customers is 0.38% at the daily horizon. The coefﬁcient for Non-Financial cus-
tomers is 0.34% at the daily horizon. Thus, at the daily horizon, both Financial and Non-
Financial customers are predominantly push customers. For the 5-day and 10-day horizon,
the coefﬁcient for Financial customers is still positive and signiﬁcant. However, the signif-
icance level decreases from 1% to 5%. This is because we include ﬂows by both Financial
and Non-Financial customers in the regression. When the time horizon increases these
changes become more similar in absolute value, but with opposite sign. Hence, including
both in a single regression gives rise to multicollinearity. The coefﬁcient for Non-Financial
customers is insigniﬁcant at the 5-day and 10-day horizon in the regression including both
Financial and Non-Financial customers.
In the regression including Non-Financial customers and Market making banks, we see
that the coefﬁcient for Non-Financial customers is insigniﬁcant at the daily horizon. This
should be no surprise since we know that at this horizon the Non-Financial customers are
predominantly push customers. The coefﬁcient for Market making banks is -0.53% at the
20daily horizon. This result shows that Market making banks act as liquidity providers at
the daily horizon. At horizons beyond one day, Non-Financial customers become more
and more important as liquidity providers. The role of Market making banks as liquid-
ity providers is decreasing with time horizon. The coefﬁcient for Market making banks
increases from -0.53% at the daily horizon to -0.05% at the 10-day horizon.
To sum up, we ﬁnd a positive correlation between net currency ﬂows and changes in the
exchange rate for Financial customers at all horizons studied. At the one-day horizon,
this positive correlation is matched by a negative correlation between the ﬂow for Market
making banks and changes in the foreign exchange rate. When the time horizon increases,
Non-Financial customers become more important as liquidity providers.
4.4 Identifying “passive side”: Granger causality — ﬂows on ﬂows
We continue by using the Granger causality test to address the other aspect of liquidity
provision, that of matching trades “passively.” The Granger causality test indicates the
ability of one series to forecast another. The idea is that if the trading of Non-Financial
customers forecasts the ﬂow of Financial customers, we can hardly say that they are on the
passive side.
Granger causality is estimated using a standard bivariate framework. This means that we
estimate whether the ﬂow of one group can forecast the ﬂow of the other group. We report
regressions estimated with 2 lags. However, the results do not change if we change to,
e.g., 1 or 3 lags. No tests indicate other lag lengths than these. Results from the Granger
causality tests are reported in Table 6.
Table 6
Granger causality tests using 2 lags. Daily observations
Does not cause: Financial Non-Financial MM
Financial na. 0.00 0.45
Non-Financial 0.72 na. 0.72
Market-mak. 0.34 0.00 na.
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. Table presents the probabilities from Granger causality tests. The hypothesis tested is whether the variable in
the left column does not cause the variable in the upper row. All variables included are ﬁrst differential of net positions (i.e., ﬂow). The
estimations are based on bivariate estimations. We only report probability of rejection.
We cannot reject the hypothesis that ﬂows of Non-Financial customers do not Granger-
cause the other ﬂows. However, we can reject that the Financial customers and Market
making banks do not cause the ﬂows of Non-Financial customers. This leads us to conclude
21that Non-Financial customers are on the passive side of the trading. Further, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that no other group causes the change in the positions of Financial
customers. Together with the regression results from the previous section this suggests the
Financial customers are a ﬁrst mover (push customers).
5 Discussion
Our results suggest that different market participants play different roles. Financial cus-
tomers will typically “push” the market. Market making banks provide liquidity in the
short run, while Non-Financial customers are important as liquidity providers in the longer
run.
Nationality is not important when explaining our results. We experiment with regressions
(See appendix) where we distinguish between Swedish and Foreign (i) Financial cus-
tomers, (ii) Non-Financial customers, and (iii) Market making banks. Nationality does not
make any signiﬁcant difference in any of the regressions. Signiﬁcant differences only exist
between different groups of market participants. As we have seen, the relations between
changes in the foreign exchange rate and the ﬂow of Financial or Non-Financial customers
is very stable.
To interpret our results, we may consider the fact that Financial and Non-Financial cus-
tomers participate in other markets than the foreign exchange market. It may be reasonable
to assume that a substantial amount of trading by Financial customers is related to portfolio
investments. For these kinds of investments, stock markets are of special importance. Stock
markets are volatile, and large price changes can occur at short notice. To give an example;
the standard deviation of the Swedish stock index (daily data, from 1.1994 to 6.2002) was
1.6% compared with 0.5% for the exchange rate. 11 The maximum daily return in the stock
market was 11.9% compared with 1.9% in the foreign exchange market. Given this kind
of volatility, timing is extremely important. It is much more important to time correctly the
investment in the stock market, than to wait for the appropriate exchange rate. Hence, it
seems reasonable that they are push customers.
Trading in stock markets would not affect the exchange rate if currency positions are
11 The stock exchange is measured by the log of the MSCI index for Sweden, and the exchange rate
as the log of the SEK/EUR.
22hedged. It is well known that investors in stock markets do not usually hedge currency
risk. 12 Two possible reasons are that currency risk is small compared to overall risk, and
that it may be difﬁcult to hedge currency risk when future cash ﬂows are uncertain.
Non-Financial customers, on the other hand, probably trade currency either to conduct
current account trading, or to make foreign direct investments. For these kinds of transac-
tions, the minute-to-minute considerations play a less important role in investment timing.
In contrast to many asset prices, most prices for goods only change slowly. In this case,
the FX part may be very important. For Non-Financial customers, the exchange rate may
be viewed as an option, i.e., the customer can wait to make the transaction until the ex-
change rate becomes “sufﬁciently” attractive. For instance, if the dollar appreciates against
the euro, US goods, like airplanes from Boeing, will become relatively more expensive
compared to European goods, like Airbus. Assume the USD/EUR-rate is 1.40, and that
most airline companies will choose to buy new airplanes from Boeing, hence buying dol-
lars. However, if the dollar appreciates to 1.00 it is likely that many airline companies will
exercise their option and rather buy from Airbus, and hence buy euros and sell dollars.
Assume that Financial customers buy dollars because they want to buy US assets. They
are “pushing” the market, and the dollar will appreciate. The dollar will appreciate such
that Non-Financial customers ﬁnd it attractive to sell the dollars. They are pull customers.
A stronger dollar makes it attractive for Non-Financial customers to sell dollars, and buy
euros, because European goods become relatively less expensive.
A natural question to ask is whether a particular group is systematically making proﬁts or
losses. An implication of the above argument is that ﬁnancial customers may be willing
to pay a premium in the foreign exchange market in order to buy assets denominated in
foreign currencies. Since Financial customers are willing to pay a premium, this means
that Non-Financial customers can sell at high prices and buy at low prices. Non-Financial
customers behave as proﬁt takers. Non-Financial customers buy and sell at prices that suit
them, that is, at prices at which they choose to exercise their option. They do not have to
perceive themselves as liquidity providers to perform this role.
12 In less volatile asset markets, we often see that currency risk is hedged.
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The provision of liquidity is important for well-functioning asset markets. Still, the liquid-
ity of the foreign exchange market, perhaps the most important ﬁnancial market, is a black
box. We know that market makers provide liquidity in the intraday market when exchange
rates are ﬂoating. This paper addresses the issue of who provides liquidity overnight in the
foreign exchange market.
To this end we use a unique data set from the Swedish foreign exchange market which
covers the trading of several distinct groups over a long time span, from the beginning of
1993 to the summer of 2002. The distinct groups we analyze are: (i) Market making banks;
(ii) Financial customers; (iii) Non-Financial customers; and (iv) the Central Bank.
We use the theory of market making to characterize what to expect of a liquidity provid-
ing group of market participants, if one exists. There are two characteristics of a liquidity
provider: (a) The net currency position of the liquidity provider will be negatively corre-
lated with the value of the currency; and (b) The trading of the liquidity provider will be
result of passively matching others’ demand and supply.
We have presented several ﬁndings supporting the proposition that Non-Financial cus-
tomers are the main liquidity providers in the Swedish market. First, we conﬁrm that there
isapositivecorrelationbetweenthenetpurchasesofcurrencymadebyFinancialcustomers
and changes in the exchange rate. Thus, when Financial investors buy SEK, the SEK tends
to appreciate. The correlation becomes stronger as we lower the frequency. These ﬁndings
are consistent with the results of Froot and Ramadorai (2002) and Fan and Lyons (2003).
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the positive correlation between net purchases of currency of
Financial customers and the exchange rate is matched by a negative correlation between the
netpurchasesofNon-Financialcustomersandchangesintheexchangerate.Thecoefﬁcient
is not only similar to the one of Financial customers in absolute value, but is also very
stable. These ﬁndings lead us to conclude that Non-Financial customers fulﬁll requirement
(a) above, while Financial customers do not.
Second, we also ﬁnd that requirement (b), that the liquidity providers passively match
changes in the demand and supply of others, is supported for the Non-Financial customers.
We ﬁnd that the trading of Financial customers and Market making banks can forecast the
24trading of Non-Financial customers, but not the other way. We interpret this as evidence
that the Non-Financial customer group is not the active part in trading.
Third, in our cointegration analysis we ﬁnd the two previous points supported for the
steady-state long run. The permanent effect of Non-Financial customers’ trading is neg-
ative, while the permanent effect of Financial customers’ trading is positive. More im-
portant, we ﬁnd that there is a close, but opposite, relation between the two ﬂows in the
long-run.
It appears that identifying a liquidity provider has been an important issue. Several authors,
e.g., Hau and Rey (2002) and several papers by Carlson and Osler, utilize the idea of
a liquidity provider comparable to the one identiﬁed here. In Carlson and Osler (2000)
“currentaccount”tradersﬁlltheroleofliquidityproviders.Theyassumethatthese“current
account” traders’ “demands for currency are [...] determined predominantly by the level of
the exchange rate and by factors unconnected to the exchange rate which appear random
to the rest of the market.”
This paper is a ﬁrst attempt to address the question of overnight liquidity provision in the
foreign exchange market. To what extent can we expect these ﬁndings to be generalized to
other currencies? The SEK is the eighth most traded currency according to the latest BIS
survey of the foreign exchange market. The Swedish currency market is similar to other
currency markets in many respects. The trading facilities are similar for most currency
markets. Trading in e.g. USD/EUR, SEK/EUR and other currency crosses take place at the
same systems. Also, the market shares of Financial and Non-Financial customers found for
the Swedish currency market, are very similar to those found for other currency markets.
Our results have implications for the exchange rate determination puzzle. We document
that changes in net positions held by Financial or Non-Financial customers are capable of
explaining changes in the foreign exchange rate at frequencies commonly used in tests of
macro economic models. Hence, it is important to acquire more knowledge about which
factors determine different FX ﬂows. This will be the focus of our future research in this
area.
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Appendix A. Tables
Table 7
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test. t-values
Test include
constant constant and trend Lags
log(SEK/EUR) -2.18 -2.14 0
(0.21) (0.52)
Financial pos. -0.95 -2.41 3
(0.77) (0.38)
Non-Financial pos. -0.40 -2.31 1
(0.91) (0.43)
10-year differential -0.96 -2.25 5
(0.77) (0.46)
3-month differential -0.91 -1.47 5
(0.78) (0.84)
CB pos. 2.77 -3.29 6
(0.07) (0.07)
interdealer pos. 0.55 -1.98 0
(0.99) (0.61)
No. Observations 2215 2215
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. Lags determined by Schwartz criterion.
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Cointegration test




Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. Cointegration-test estimated with the Johansen-method. The VAR models the exchange rate change and the
ﬂows of the two customer groups. The other variables in the cointegrating vectors are not modeled. Differences of these, and one lag
of differences, are included in the VAR. The VAR contains two lags, determined by F-test. In the test the trend is restricted to lie in the
cointegration space, while constants are unrestricted.
Table 9
Cointegration results with minimal set of restrictions. Daily observations
Financial Non-Financial
a) Cointegration SEK/EUR Non-Fin pos SEK/EUR Non-Fin pos
Financial 0.0029 -0.6986 0 -0.61552
(0.0048) (0.3301) (–) (0.32255)
Non-Financial 0 -0.0021
(–) (0.0034)
10-year bond diff. 5.53 0 5.24 0
(1.52) (–) (1.59) (–)
3-month diff. -2.24 0 -2.13 0
(1.07) (–) (1.05) (–)
CB-position 0 -1.80 0 -1.92
(–) (0.26) (–) (0.33)
MM-position 0 -0.81 0 -0.87
(–) (0.44) (–) (0.49)
Trend 0.00010 -0.008 0.00005 -0.011
(0.00008) (0.006) (0.00003) (0.006)
b) Error correction term
DSEK/EUR -0.0114 -0.000103 -0.0118 -0.000106
(0.0027) (0.000055) (0.0028) (0.000052)
DNonFinancial -0.002692 -0.002692 -0.002606 -0.002606
(0.001661) (0.001661) (0.001559) (0.001559)
DFinancial 0.000319 0.000319 0.000428 0.000428
(0.001695) (0.001695) (0.001591) (0.001591)
c) Test Test stat. p-value Test stat. p-value
LR test of restrictions 2.19 0.70 2.20 0.70
No. Observations 2214 2214
Sample: 1.1994-6.2002. Cointegration estimated with the Johansen-method. The VAR models the exchange rate change and the ﬂows
of the two customer groups. The other variables in the cointegrating vectors are not modeled. Differences of these, and one lag of
differences, are included in the VAR. The VAR contains two lags, determined by F-test. Standard errors of coefﬁcients in parenthesis.
The SEK/EUR cointegrating vectors are normalized on the exchange rate, while the ﬂow cointegrating vectors in column Non-Fin pos
are normalized on the position of the Non-Financial customers. Cointegration results are reported as if the normalizing variable is a
left-hand-side variable. All cells without standard error are the result of restrictions. The test of the restrictions are reported in panel c).
27Table 10
Flows and returns and nationality.
Customers
Financial Non-Financial Market Makers
Foreign=Swedish Foreign=Swedish Foreign=Swedish
F-stat 0.89 0.11 0.01
Prob 0.35 0.74 0.92
Foreign customers Swedish customers Swedish Non-Financial
Financial=Non-Financial Financial=Non-Financial =Foreign Financial
F-stat 4.20 0.72 30.22
Prob 0.04 0.40 0.00
The table shows a GMM regression on (log(SEK/EUR)t −log(SEK/EURt−30). All regressions are for 30-day horizon. In addition
to ﬂow variables we include three-month and ten-year interest rate differentials. We only report the test statistics from the test that
coefﬁcients are similar (e.g. Swedish=Foreign). Sample: 1.1994-6.2002.
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